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INTRODUCTION

In McLeod v. Starnes,' the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Webb v.
Sowell and reversed a family court's refusal to award a custodial parent
financial support for her son's postsecondary education under South Carolina

I.
396 S.C. 647, 723 S.E.2d 198 (2012).
2.
387 S.C. 328, 692 SE.2d 543 (2010), overruled by MtcLeod, 396 S.C. 647. 723 S.E.2d
198 (2012).
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Code section 63-3-530(A)(17).
After the mother appealed the family court's
dismissal, the supreme court analyzed the equal protection implications
associated with mandating postsecondary financial support inder the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and applied a rational basis level
of scrutiny. The court held that requiring a parent to pay for college expenses as
an incident of child support tinder the classification created by South Carolina
Code section 63-3-530(A)(17) between divorced parents and non-divorced
parents is rationally related to the state's interest in promoting postsecondary
education and. thus, is constitutional.
Contrary to the court's analysis, the equal protection issue does not lie solely
within a classification between divorced and non-divorced parents-although
relevant-but rather within a classification of children of unmarried parents
versus those of "intact" families.6 The statute protects children of unmarried
parents by providing them with the financial opportunity to attend college
through court order, but denies similarly situated children of intact families the
same opportunity. 7 Therefore, the McLeod court failed to properly analyze
section 63-3-530(A)(17)'s constitutionality according to the most pertinent
classification created by the statute.8
Notwithstanding the improper classification on which the MeLeod court
based its analysis, the holding represents the court's recognition of a broader
issue. In today's society, eighteen-year-old children-considered adults under
the law9-are often unable to support themselves financially, especially while

3.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-530(A)(17) (1976); McLeod, 396 S.C. at 662, 723 S.E.2d at 207.
The composition of the court changed between the 4ebb decision and the holding in McLeod.
Within the two-year period, Justice Hearn replaced Justice Waller on the South Carolina Supreme
Court.
4.
McLeod, 396 S.C. at 655 58, 723 SE.2d at 203-05.
5.
Id. at 658, 723 SE.2d at 204-05. The court restricted its holding to find that requiring a
parent to pay for postsecondary education as an incident of child support is constitutional "under the
appropriate and limited circumstances outlined by Risinger." Id. at 658, 723 SE.2d at 204 (citing
Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979), abrogatedby Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C.
328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010)).
6.
Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 269 (Pa. 1995); see also McLeod, 396 S.C. at 668, 723
S.E.2d at 210 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the classification used by the majority in its
equal protection analysis and identifying the factually similar Kline case as persuasive authority
supporting his view); Dan Huitink, Forced FinancialAid: Two Arguments as to Why lowa's Law
Authorizing Courts to Order Divorced Parents to Pay Postsecondary-Education Subsidies Is
Unconstitutional, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1423, 1444 49 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of the
classification made among students under Iowa's Postsecondary-Support Statute). The term "intact
family" refers to the traditional nuclear family consisting of a husband, a wife, and their biological
dependent children. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: [he Need

for Legal Alternatives When the Premise ofthe Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
879 n.1 (1984).
7.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-530(A)(17) (1976).
See McLeod, 396 S.C. at 656-60. 723 S.E.2d at 203-05.
8.
9.
S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 14 ("Every citizen who is eighteen years of age or older, not
laboring under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law, shall be
deemed sui juris and endowed with full legal rights and responsibilities . . . "
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pursuing a college degree, whereas the need for a postsecondary education has
become ever more essential to reaching a strong economic and professional
future. 10 In order to protect the state's interest in promoting postsecondary
education, as well as adequately providing support for all children in need of
postsecondary financial assistance and subsequently avoiding future equal
protection challenges, the law, through legislative enactment, should afford the
family court with the discretion to require any parent to provide postsecondary
educational support for his or her child, regardless of the parent's or child's
familial classification.
Part II of this Note analyzes the progression of judicially-mandated
postsecondary educational expenses as an incident of child support in South
Carolina and the principal South Carolina decisions that address the issue. Part
III discusses the origins of parental obligations within the context of various
noteworthy decisions from other jurisdictions. Part IV briefly explores the
framework of an equal protection challenge under a rational basis level of
scrutiny. Based on the dissenting opinions in relevant South Carolina Supreme
Court cases, as well as the majority opinion of an important case from another
jurisdiction, Part IV argues that the McLeod court employed the wrong
classification in its analysis and posits that the proper, and most significant,
classification created by South Carolina Code section 63-3-530(A)(17) is one
between children of divorced or unmarried parents and those of intact families.
Finally, Part V addresses the various policy arguments for and against providing
court-mandated support for college expenses past the age of majority and argues
for a legislative expansion of McLeod that will afford courts with the jurisdiction
and discretion to mandate financial support for all children in South Carolina,
without regard to familial classification.

10. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF VOCATIONAL & ADULT EDUC., POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION TRANSITION: A SUNIMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FROM Two LITERATURE REVIEWS 1
(2010). availableathttp://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/cclo/transition-literature-reviews.pdf.
11. An additional issue brought about by the decision in McLeod v. Starnes is its possible
retroactive effect on two groups of divorced parents: (1) those whose children attended college
between the years of 2010 and 2012 and incurred expenses during this period as a result of the
febb decision and (2) those parents whose children attended college prior to 2010 with financial
assistance subject to a family court order providing college expenses. It is unclear after McLeod
whether a court could make these two groups of parents pay under the prior order for the two-year
period during which Wf
ebb was in effect. See McLeod 396 S.C. at 658, 723 S.E.2d at 204.
According to Robert M. Wilcox, Dean of the University of South Carolina School of Law, the
South Carolina Supreme Court is not likely to retroactively apply the holding in McLeod to these
two groups of parents for two reasons: (1) the four factors outlined in Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C.
36, 253 S.E. 2d 652 (1979), would no longer apply, as the children would have attended college
during the two-year gap and, therefore, would be seen as otherwise able to provide for college
expenses, and (2) the interest of fairness and the possibility of resulting "havoc"-for example, the
harsh implications of retroactively imposing liability on parents who relied on Webb in planning
their financial affairs mitigate against such an application. DVD: Dean Robert M. Wilcox, Univ.
of S.C. Sch. of Law. Presentation at the S.C. Bar Convention: College Expenses, WJebb v. Sowell &
McLeod v. Starnes. Where Are We? (Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Wilcox CLE Presentation] (on file
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4. Risinger v. Risinger: The FirstInterpretationin South Carolina
By enacting section 63-3-530(A)(17), the South Carolina General Assembly
vested the family court with exclusive jurisdiction to mandate child support after
a child reaches eighteen years of age when that child suffers from a mental or
physical disability or tinder other "exceptional circumstances" warranting the
continuation of support beyond the age of majority.
In 1979, the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Risinger v. Risinger first interpreted the statute as
affording the family court with jurisdiction to require a non-custodial parent to
provide financial support for postsecondary educational expenses.14 In Risinger,
a father challenged the family court's award of financial support for his nineteenyear-old daughter, Lisa., as part of a divorce decree.1 Lisa was a dean's list
student and made all possible efforts to minimize the cost of her education by
working part-time jobs, living at home, attending summer school, and applying
for student loans., Without support from her father, however, Lisa would no
longer have been able to attend college.17
The court recognized similarities between children with physical and mental
disabilities and those in great need of an education, including an income
potential that is "either diminished or entirely lacking," as well as the usual
compulsion felt by parents to provide financial assistance in both
circumstances. The court subsequently classified the need for education as an
"exceptional circumstance" justifying continued financial support tinder the
statute.
The court enumerated four factors to assist the family court in
determining whether to mandate extended support, holding that the court may
require parental contribution when the circumstances are such that:
(1) the characteristics of the child indicate that he or she will benefit
from college; (2) the child demonstrates the ability to do well, or at least
make satisfactory grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise go to school;

with author). This issue of the potential retroactive application of McLeod is beyond the scope of
this Note.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-530(A)(17) (1976).
13. 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979), abrogatedby Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328, 692
S.E.2d 543 (2010).
14. Id. at 39, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
15. Id. at 37, 253 S.E.2d at 652.
16. Id. at 37, 253 S.E.2d at 652 53.
17. Id. at 37, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
18. Id. at 38, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
19. Id.
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and (4) the parent has the financial ability to help pay for such an
education. 20
The court declined to restrict its holding to the aforementioned factors, thus
providing future courts with broad discretion when making the determination of
whether to provide postsecondary educational expenses.
B.

Webb v. Sowell: Overturning Years ofPrecedent

South Carolina courts continued to apply the Risinger court's interpretation
of the statute until 2010, when the South Carolina Supreme Court abrogated the
Risinger decision in Webb v. Sowell. In TWTebb, a father sought a reduction of
his child support obligations based on his son's attainment of the age of
majority,n prompting the mother to counterclaim for college expenses. 4 The
father moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Risinger court's
interpretation of section 63-3-530(A)(17) amounted to a violation of his equal
protection rights.
The family court dismissed the father's motion and ordered
26
him to contribute equally to the son's educational expenses.
The father
subsequently appealed the court's award of college expenses to the South
Carolina Supreme Court.27
Justice Pleicones, writing for the court, analyzed the statute based on a
classification between "those parents subject to a child support order at the time
of the child's emancipation" and those not subject to a court order.28 Employing
a rational basis analysis, the court failed to recognize a foundation on which it
could justify the classification such that it would withstand the father's equal
protection challenge.29 Thus, the court declared the statute unconstitutional. 0
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Toal contested the majority's
classification analysis-declaring it improper because the father did not
challenge the constitutionality of the statute based on a classification between
parents subject to a court order and those not subject to a court order. Rather,

20. Id. at 39, 253 S.E.2d at 653-54.
21. Id at 39, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
22. 387 S.C. 328, 332 33, 692 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2010), overruledby McLeod v. Starnes, 396
S.C. 647, 723 S.E.2d 198 (2012).
23. Id. at 329. 692 S.E.2d at 544.
24. Id
25. Id. at 329-30. 692 S.E.2d at 544.
26. Id.
27. Id at 330, 692 S.E.2d at 544.
28. Id at 332, 692 S.E.2d at 545.
29. Id. ("We ... can discern no rational basis for the varied treatment of the class as
compared to those parents wlio are not subject to such an order."). The court's "analysis"---or lack
thereof neglected to explain why the statute was not reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest and therefore failed the rational basis test. See id.
30. Id. at 332-33. 692 S.E.2d at 545.
31. Id. at 333-34. 692 S.E.2d at 546 (Toal, CJ., dissenting).
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the father challenged the statute's constitutionality based on the classification it
creates between divorced parents and non-divorced parents. Regardless of the
classification cited by the court, Chief Justice Toal argued that the statute did not
create a classification at all, but that it instead treated divorced and non-divorced
parents equally. Chief Justice Toal argued that the statute should be interpreted
as conferring jurisdiction to order support for postsecondary education "in the
discretion of the court." 34
Justice Kittredge, in a second dissenting opinion, employed a legislative
intent argument to support the constitutionality of the statute.
According to
Justice Kittredge, the General Assembly's failure to modify the statute and
specifically exclude the need for postsecondary support as an "exceptional
circumstance" reflected its intent to provide the family court with jurisdiction to
order the contribution of expenses for postsecondary education.36
Most
importantly, Justice Kittredge recognized that "[a] legislative policy of treating
children of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents differently than children of
married parents . . . is most assuredly a debatable proposition."37 Despite his
recognition of the controversial policy implications of the statute, Justice
Kittredge argued that the statute withstood an equal protection challenge because
"no suspect classification [was] involved."

32. Id. at 334, 692 S.E.2d at 546.
33. Id. at 334-35, 692 S.E.2d at 546-47 (quoting Riggs v. Riggs, 353 S.C. 230, 236, 578
S.E.2d 3, 6 (2003)) (discussing the court's decision in Riggs, whereby it dismissed a father's equal
protection challenge to an award of support for an unenancipated disabled adult child and held that
the statutory section applied equally to divorced and non-divorced parents).
63-3-530(A)(17) (1976))
34. Id. at 334, 692 S.E.2d at 546 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Chief Justice's argument, if accepted by the majority
would have alleviated the issues addressed in this Note because it would subject all parents to the
provisions of the statute, thus eliminating all classifications between married and unmarried parents,
as well as the classification created between children of non-intact families and those of intact
families. Given that the supreme court revisited the same issue two years later in McLeod and failed
to hold that the statute applied to both divorced and non-divorced parents, the court seems to be in
agreement that, contrary to Chief Justice Toal's dissent, it does not have the discretion to require
non-divorced parents to pay for college expenses under section 63-3-530(A)(17). See Wilcox CLE
Presentation, supra note 11; see also McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657. 723 S.E.2d 198, 204
(2012) (analyzing the father's equal protection claim-a claim that would be considered moot if the
statute applied to non-divorced parents).
35. Webb. 387 S.C. at 335-36, 692 S.E.2d at 547 (Kittredge, J., dissenting) (citing Risinger v.
Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 39, 253 S.E.2d 652. 653-54 (1979). abrogatedby Webb v. Sowell. 387 S.C.
328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010)).
36. Id. at 336, 692 S.E.2d at 547.
37. Id.
38. Id. It is unclear whether Justice Kittredge meant that the suspect classification was not
involved because the father who sought a reduction in child support failed to bring that
classification before the court and raise the issue, or simply because the statute does not create a
classification that treats children of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents differently than
children of married parents. See id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/10
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C. McLeod v. Starnes: A Return to Risinger
Less than two years after the supreme court's decision in WJ'ebb v. Sowell, the
South Carolina Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of section 63-3530(A)(17) in MeLeod v. Starnes.39 In MeLeod, a divorced mother brought an
action seeking college expenses for her adult son after the father failed to abide
by an agreement to provide financial assistance for the son's postsecondary
education. 40 The family court dismissed the mother's claim, concluding that it
violated the father's equal protection rights under the United States
Constitution.4 1 The mother appealed the family court's dismissal to the South
Carolina Supreme Court and challenged the family court's failure to award
college expenses.42
In its review, the supreme court first addressed the WJ'ebb majority's failure
to "investigat[e] whether there [was] any basis to support the alleged
classification or [to justify] refuting the bases argued."4 The court concluded
that its previous failure to properly determine the existence of rational basis
support constituted an inappropriate application of a strict scrutiny standard in
analyzing the statute's constitutionality. The court recognized the controversial
implications of overturning the court's recent decision in Webb, but it
nevertheless stated that "[s]tare decisis should be used to foster stability and
certainty in the law, but[] not to perpetuate error."45
Following its renunciation of WJebb's interpretation of the classification
created by the statute and its application of a strict scrutiny standard, the court
reviewed the Risinger decision to inquire "whether it improperly treats divorced
parents differently than non-divorced parents" under a rational basis analysis.46
The court acknowledged the state's strong interests in both supporting the
education of young adult citizens and attempting to minimize the disadvantages
faced by children of divorced parents. ' According to the court, the Risinger
interpretation of the statute was an attempt at furthering the aforementioned state
interests by "seek[ing] to identify those children whose parents would otherwise
have paid for their college education, but for the divorce, and provide them with

39. 396 S.C. 647, 723 S.E.2d 198 (2012).
40. Id. at 652. 723 S.E.2d at 201-02.
41. Id. at 653, 723 S.E.2d at 202.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 656. 723 S.E.2d at 204.
44. See id. at 654 57, 723 S.E.2d at 203-04.
45. Id. at 655, 723 S.E.2d at 203 (alteration in original) (quoting Fitzer v. Greater Greenville
S.C. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 277 S.C. 1, 4, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1981). superseded by
statute on other grounds, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-55-200, -210 (2006) (current version at S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-56-170, -180 (2006 & Supp. 2012)), as recognized in Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'1 Med.
Ctr., 341 S.C. 32, 41 n.3, 533 S.E. 2d 312, 317 n.3 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 657. 723 S.E.2d at 204.
47. Id. at 657-58. 723 S.E.2d at 204.
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that benefit." 8 The court held that court-mandated financial support for
postsecondary education as an incident of child support under the "limited
circumstances outlined by Risinger" was rationally related to the state's interest
and therefore withstood an equal protection challenge. 49
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Beatty argued that the proper issue before the
-50
court was not an equal protection issue but an issue of statutory interpretation.
Justice Beatty believed that had the General Assembly intended to provide for
postsecondary expenses past the age of majority as an incident of child support,
it would have specifically included language to that effect in the statute.51
Therefore, under Justice Beatty's interpretation, the family court does not have
jurisdiction to require a divorced parent to pay college expenses under section
63-3-530(A)(1 7).
Although Justice Beatty stated that the court's analysis of the constitutional
implications of the statute was improper, he specifically addressed the equal
protection issue to express his disagreement with the majority's analysis.
In
his view, the classification created by the statute is not one of divorced parents
versus non-divorced parents but rather a classification between children of
unmarried parents and those of intact families.5 4 According to Justice Beatty, the
Risinger decision created a legal duty for divorced, separated, or unmarried
parents to pay postsecondary education expenses, but it failed to create the same
duty for parents of intact families.f Despite recognizing the negative effects of
divorce, Justice Beatty argued that both classes of children are similar in that
they have reached the age of majority but continue to have a strong financial
need for support in order to obtain a college education-a goal that might only
be accomplished with financial assistance from their parents.56 As a result,
Justice Beatty reasoned that the "[s]tate does not have a legitimate interest in
treating separated, divorced, or unmarried parents and their children differently
than their intact counterparts."
In support of his conclusion, Justice Beatty
cited a comparable case in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that
a state providing college expenses for only those majority-aged children whose
parents were divorced-and not those of intact families-violated of the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 8

48. Id. at 658. 723 S.E.2d at 204.
49. Id.
50. Id at 663, 723 S.E.2d at 207 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 664. 723 S.E.2d at 208.
52. Id. at 665-66. 723 S.E.2d at 208.
53. Id at 666, 723 S.E.2d at 208-09.
54. Id at 668, 723 S.E.2d at 210.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id (footnote omitted).
58. Id at 669, 723 S.E.2d at 210 ("In the absence of ain entitlement on the part of any
individual to post-secondary education, or a generally applicable requirement that parents assist
their adult children in obtaining such an education, we perceive no rational basis for the state
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ANALYSIS

A.

The Common Law Origins ofParental Obligation

Court-mandated postsecondary educational support is a modern judicial
construct. Prior to the adoption of state statutes vesting courts with jurisdiction
to award college expenses, courts analyzed the issue of whether parents had an
obligation to supply college expenses by determining whether education
qualified as a. "necessary" under common law.59 Necessaries were not limited to
those "things which were strictly essential to support life."60 Under a common
law analysis, the Vermont Supreme Court first considered whether a college
education was a "necessary" in 1844 in Afiddlebray College v. Chandler.61 The
court determined that a college education did not constitute a necessary in the
legal sense, distinguishing it from a common school education that was
considered "essential to the intelligent discharge of civil, political, and religious
duties." 62 Recognizing that the majority of citizens at that time never received a
college education, the court stated that it could not possibly be a "necessary."63
In 1926, the common law analysis employed by the Afiddlebwry court
shifted. In Esteb v. Esteb 64 the Supreme Court of Washington determined that a
college education is a "necessary" and found the Middlebury analysis outdated.65
Reasoning that almost a century had passed since the Afiddlebwry decision, and
recognizing the progression of both the educational environment and the public
policy associated with the attainment of a college education, the court awarded
college expenses.

govermnent to provide only certain adult citizens with legal means to overcome the difficulties they
encounter in pursuing that end." (quoting Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 269-70 (Pa. 1995))).
59. See, e.g., Middlebury Coll. v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683, 685-86 (Vt. 1844) (considering
wvhether a college education falls into the category of "necessaries").
60. Lindsay E. Cohen, Note, Daddy. Will Iou Buy te a College Education? Children of
Divorce and the Constitutional Inplications of Noncustodial Parents Providing fin Higher
Education, 66 Mo. L. REV. 187, 189 90 (2001) (citing Middlebury, 16 Vt. at 686).
61. 16 Vt. at 686.
62. Id.
63. Id. This argument would not be persuasive or applicable today, as the percentage of
Americans that attend college has risen drastically. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "In
October 2012, 66.2 percent of 2012 high school graduates were enrolled in colleges or universities."
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, College Enrollment and Work
Activity of 2012 High School Graduates (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.bs.gov/news.
release/hsgec.nr0.htm.
64. 244 P. 264 (Wash. 1926).
65. Id. at 267.
66. Id. ("But conditions have changed greatly in almost a century that has elapsed since that
time. Where the college graduate of that day was the exception, to-day such a person may almost be
said to be the rule.").
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B. The Shift Away from Common Law: The Constitutionality of State
Statutes
1. A ClassificationBetween Marriedand UnmarriedParents
Since Esteb, most court decisions on the issue are no longer based on a
traditional common law analysis, but rather involve the evaluation of the
constitutionality of state statutes that give courts the power to award
postsecondary educational expenses.67 A survey of relevant case law across the
United States reveals a prevailing trend among courts of upholding state statutes
that provide for postsecondary educational expenses under a rational basis
analysis. 6 8 In Childers v. Childers,69 the Washington Supreme Court reviewed
the trial court's decree of dissolution which ordered a non-custodial father to pay
for his sons' college expenses.0 The trial court's authority was derived from a
state statute that allowed courts to require a parent subject to a duty of support to
"pay an amount reasonable or necessary" without regard to the child's attainment
of the age of majority but rather based solely on the child's emancipation.
Affirming the trial court's decision, the Washington Supreme Court outlined
the numerous hardships faced by children of divorced parents and the court's
duty to alleviate those disadvantages.
The court stated that married parents are
more likely to provide educational expenses for their children than non-custodial
parents and argued that the statute did not create any classification whatsoever,
because it simply generated the same expectations for non-custodial parents as
those already imposed on married parents]. Conversely, if the statute did create
a classification, the court held that it rested upon a "reasonable basis" and was
rationally related to a legitimate government interest in the welfare of its children

67. See Cohen, supra note 60, at 193-94.
68. See id. at 196 ("Most states that have considered the issue have upheld the state statute
under equal protection analysis by determining that the statute was rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose."); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980) (noting that
the state had "a legitimate interest ir promotimg higher education for its citizens" and that the statute
was "rationally related to protecting that interest"); LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 1357 (N.H.
1993) (noting that the state had "legitimate interests" and that the statutes in place were "rationally
related to protecting" those interests), superseded by statute, NIH. REv. STAT. § 461-A: 14 (Supp.
2008). as recognized in In re Goulart, 965 A.2d 1068, 1070 (N.H. 2009): Childers v. Childers. 575
P.2d 201, 209 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (using "the rational relationship test" to hold a "decree [for]
support for the education of normal children past the age of majority" constitutional).
69. 575P.2d20L
70. Id. at 203.
71. Id. at 204 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1971) (amended 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 207-08 (quoting Robert M. Washburn, Post-MajoritySupport: Oh Dad, Poor Dad,
44 TEMP. L.Q. 319, 327, 329 (1971)).
73. Id. at 208 (quoting Esteb v. Esteb. 244 P. 264. 267 (Wash. 1926)).
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and the greater good of society.74
The court therefore upheld the
constitutionality of the statute under a rational basis analysis.
Courts have continued to follow the model applied in Childers-upholding
the constitutionality of state statutes that give family courts the authority to
require a non-custodial parent to pay for college expenses under a rational basis
analysis. In LeClair v. LeClair,76 the New Hampshire Supreme Court analyzed a
state statute that gave courts the discretion to award educational support in cases
where there is a divorce decree.
Referencing policy implications similar to
those cited in Childers, including the disadvantages faced by children of
divorced parents as well as the greater likelihood for intact parents to provide
educational expenses, the court reasoned that the state had "dual legitimate
interests of promoting higher education for its citizens, and of extending
protections to children of divorce to ensure that they are not deprived of
opportunities they otherwise would have received had their parents not
divorced." 8 Accordingly, the court found that the classification created by the
state statute between divorced and non-divorced parents was rationally related to
the aforementioned state interests and therefore upheld the statute's
79
constitutionality under a rational basis analysis.
0
In Kujawinski v. Kujawinskis the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the
constitutionality of a state statute that gave courts the authority to provide
educational support for children of divorced parents based on the financial
resources of the parents, the child's theoretical standard of living had the
marriage stayed intact, and the financial resources of the child, regardless of
whether the child reached the age of majority.8 The court recognized that the
nature of divorce, as well as its inevitable impact on the economic and personal
lives of the children involved, unfortunately reduces the chances a child of
divorced parents has of receiving financial support for educational expenses
from the non-custodial parent.
The court held that the challenged statute's
imposition of financial obligations that required divorced parents to fund their
child's education was reasonably related to its ultimate goal of alleviating some

74. Id. at 208-09.
75. Id. at 209.
76. 624 A.2d 1350, 1357 (N.HI. 1993), superseded by statute, N.H. REV. STAT. §461-A:14
(Supp. 2008), as recognized in In re Goulart. 965 A.2d 1068. 1070 (N.H. 2009).
77. Id. at 1353. LeClair has since been overturned by In re Goulart, 965 A.2d at 1070,
following an amendment of the statute that specifically prohibits awards of postsecondary
educational expenses by child support order.
78. LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1357.
79. Id.
80. 376 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1978).
81. Id. at 1389 (quoting 40 ILL. REV. STAT. 510(c), 513 (1977) (current version at 750 ILL.
CON.

STAT. 5/510,5/513 (2012))).

82. Id. at 1389-90.
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of the hardships faced by children of divorced parents.8 Thus, under a rational
basis analysis, the court upheld the statute's constitutionality.84
2.

4 ClassificationBetween Children ofJ
of Unmarried Parents

arriedParentsand Children

Although many courts-including those in South Carolina-base their
analyses of the equal protection issue created by postsecondary-support statutes
on either a classification between divorced and non-divorced parents or between
those parents subject to court order and parents not subject to court order, one
court's decision based on the classification created between children of
unmarried or divorced parents and those of intact families is quite persuasive.
The importance of the analysis in Curtis v. Kline,86 a 1995 decision by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,8 to the arguments explicated in this Note is
profound. The court in Kline outlined the appropriate equal protection analysis
of state statutes that implicate classifications between children of divorced or
unmarried parents and those of intact families.
In Kline, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania faced a constitutional challenge
to a Pennsylvania statute, brought by a father in response to a court order
requiring him to provide support for two of his majority-aged children that
attended college.89 Under the statute as enacted, "a court may order ... parents
who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing
support obligation to provide equitably for educational costs of their child
whether an application for this support is made before or after the child has
reached 18 years of age."90 Applying a rational basis analysis, the court
considered whether the state had "a legitimate interest in treating children of
separated, divorced, or unmarried parents differently than [similarly situated]
children of married parents with respect to the costs of post-secondary
education," namely children with a similar financial need for postsecondary
educational expenses.
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare argued that the statute
should withstand a constitutional challenge tinder the Equal Protection Clause
because the distinction it created was reasonable in light of two important policy

83. Id. at 1390.
84. Id.
85. See e.g., Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995) (noting that the classification
adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature was "not focused on the parents but rather the children").
86. 666 A.2d 265.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 268-70.
89. Id. at 267 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4 3 27(a) (1993), invalidated by Curtis v. Kline,
666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995)).
90. Id. (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327(a) (1993), invalidated by Curtis v. Kline. 666
A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 269.
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considerations: (1) the protection of intact families from governmental
interference and (2) the desire to provide educational benefits for children of
non-intact families to alleviate the inevitable disadvantages they face. 92In
rejecting that argument, the court reasoned that,
In the absence of an entitlement on the part of any individual to postsecondary education, or a generally applicable requirement that parents
assist their adult children in obtaining such an education. we perceive no
rational basis for the state government to provide only certain adult
citizens with legal means to overcome the difficulties they encounter in
93
pursuing that end.
Although the court recognized that its holding stood contrary to the treatment of
a similar statute in the LeClair decision rendered by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, it refused to adopt the analysis employed by the LeClair court
because the discriminatory classification created by the Pennsylvania statute
focused on children rather than on their parents.9
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
4. The ClassificationAnalyzed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
McLeod
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution states that "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."95 To withstand an equal protection
challenge of a statute whose classification neither is inherently suspect nor does
it infringe on a fundamental right, the classification must be reasonably,
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.96
The legislative goal of South Carolina Code section 63-3-530(A)(17), as
interpreted first by the Risinger court and subsequently by the McLeod court, is
to "identify those children whose parents would otherwise have paid for their
college education, but for the divorce," and to provide them with a financial
benefit to ease the educational disadvantages they confront.97 South Carolina

92. Id.
93. Id. at 269-70 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 270 (citing LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1357 (NI-I 1993), superseded by
statute N.H. REV. STAT. § 461-A: 14 (Supp. 2008), as recognized in in re Goulart, 965 A.2d 1068,
1070 (N.H. 2009)).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
97. McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 658, 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) (citing Risinger v.
Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 39, 253 SE.2d 652. 653-54 (1979). abrogatedby Webb v. Sowell. 387 S.C.
328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390 (111.1978)).
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has a legitimate interest in the welfare of its citizens as well as in the education
of its youth to ensure productive members of society for the future. 98 Therefore,
the question courts must address upon an equal protection challenge to South
Carolina Code section 63-3-530(A)(17) is whether the classification created by
the statute is reasonably related to the legitimate state interest of educating South
Carolina's youth. Before this question can be answered, however, it must first
be determined what classification the statute creates.
B. An Equal Protection Analysis of the Classification Created by Section
63-3-530(1) (17): W4hat ClassificationIs Really at Issue?
Courts that examine equal protection challenges to statutes that subject noncustodial parents to postsecondary educational support orders analyze the
constitutionality of each statute according to the various classifications they
create. 99 For example, the Webb court analyzed the classification as one between
parents subject to a court order and parents not subject to court order. 00 Further,
the McLeod court approached the equal protection issue in view of a
classification between divorced and non-divorced parents. 101 Additionally, the
Kline court analyzed the constitutionality of classifying children of divorced,
unmarried, or separated parents differently than children of intact families.' 0 2
Although most statutes that require parents to provide postsecondary
educational support do create all of the aforementioned classifications, the most
significant, controversial, and therefore dubious, classification to consider under
an equal protection analysis is that analyzed in Kline-a classification between
similarly situated children of divorced, unmarried, or separated parents and those
of intact families. 0
As stated by the court in Kline, statutes similar to the
Pennsylvania statute analyzed in Kline, as well as the instant South Carolina
statute, classify "young adults according to the marital status of their parents,
establishing for one group an action to obtain a benefit enforceable by court
order that is not available to the other group." 04 Therefore, the relevant class to
consider in an equal protection challenge to court-mandated postsecondary
educational support is not parents of non-intact families or those subject to court

98. Id. at 657. 723 S.E.2d at 204.
99. For example, the classifications include those subject to court order versus those not
subject to court order: divorced parent versus non-divorced parents: and children of divorced,
separated, or unmarried families versus those of intact families. See, e.g., Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C.
328, 332, 692 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2010) (analyzing parents subject to a court order versus those not
subject to a court order), overruled by McLeod, 396 S.C. at 657, 723 S.E.2d at 204 (analyzing
divorced parents versus non-divorced parents).
100. Webb. 387 S.C. at 332. 692 S.E.2d at 545.
101. McLeod, 396 S.C. at 657, 723 S.E.2d at 204.
102. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 269 (Pa. 1995).
103. Id.

104. Id.
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order, but rather the class to consider consists of children in need of financial
support to receive a postsecondary education. 105
It is objectively indisputable that all classifications created by section 63-3530(A)(17), as well as classifications created by analogous statutes enacted in
other jurisdictions, are subject to the rational basis standard rather than a strict or
intermediate scrutiny standard. 1o
Classifications of divorced, unmarried, or
separated parents do not implicate a suspect class. 107 Likewise, a classification
created between children of intact families and children of non-intact familiesalthough an immutable characteristiclos-is also not considered a suspect
class.
Additionally, the United States Constitution does not provide an
individually protected right to a postsecondary education. 0 Consequently, the
rational basis test should be applied when either classification is analyzed under
an equal protection challenge.
C. Wf~hat Should the South Carolina Supreme Court Have Done in
McLeod?
Although section 63-3-530(A)(17) does create a classification between
divorced parents and non-divorced parents that is relevant to an equal protection
analysis,I the classification created between children of unmarried, divorced, or
separated parents and children of intact families is the most controversial
classification-and thus the most relevant to an equal protection analysis. In his
dissenting opinion in WJebb, Justice Kittredge recognized the suspicious
character of the latter classification, stating that differing legislative treatment of
children of divorced, unmarried or separated parents and those of intact families
was "assuredly a debatable proposition."1
The McLeod court had direct access
to the most persuasive dissenting opinion on the issue, however, and therefore
did not need to look to Justice Kittredge's opinion in Webb.' 13 Justice Beatty's
dissenting opinion in McLeod not only acknowledged the appropriate class
created under the statute, but it also recognized that because South Carolina does
not have a legitimate state interest in treating children of unmarried, divorced, or

105. Id.
106. See Cohen, supra note 60, at 196.
107. See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657-58, 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012).
108. See Huitink, supra note 6, at 1445 (citing ERWlN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.6, at 777 (3d ed. 2006)).
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louis, 654 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Iowa 2002) (citing Bowers v. Polk
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 2002)) ("Unless a suspect class or a
fundamental right is involved, any classification made by the legislature need only have a rational
basis.").
110. Kline. 666 A.2d. at 268.
111. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-530(A)(17) (1976).
112. Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328, 336 692 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2010) (Kittredge, J.,
dissenting), overruledby M111cLeod, 396 S.C. 647, 723 S.E.2d 198.
113. Id.
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separated families-or their parents for that matter-differently than those of
their intact counterparts, the statute was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution."' In support of his opinion, Justice Beatty cited the
Kline court's analysis.11
In considering only the classification between divorced and non-divorced
parents, the McLeod court failed to recognize the real implications of section 633-530(A)(17).
Had the AcLeod court properly acknowledged the serious
inequities of the statute for children of intact families in need of financial
assistance but unable to compel parental support through court order, it may
have reached a different conclusion. In McLeod, the South Carolina Supreme
Court should have discussed whether preferential treatment-in terms of
providing a financial opportunity to higher education---of children of non-intact
families was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of promoting
postsecondary education as an attempt to alleviate the hardships faced by those
children.
V. IT IS NOT THAT EASY
4. Policy Arguments Jbr and 4gainst Providing PostsecondaryEducation
for Similarly SituatedChildren
What should state legislatures and court systems do to adequately defend
their state's interest in promoting postsecondary education while also protecting
the rights of all of its citizens? The answer is far from simple. Children of
divorced, separated, or unmarried parents undoubtedly face constant
disadvantages when compared to their counterparts-children of "intact"
families. For example, the income of single-parent households is significantly
lower on average than that of intact families, and child-rearing expenses
consume a greater proportion of household income.
Non-custodial parents are
less likely to willfully contribute economically to the child's educational and
personal needs.
Although courts subject non-custodial parents to courtordered support, the child support awarded is often inadequate, particularly in
view of the average expenditures on, and investment in, children by parents in
intact families., Consequently, the support provided is insufficient to cover the

114. McLeod, 396 S.C. at 668, 723 S.E.2d at 210 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (citing Kline, 666 A.2d at 270).
116. See MARK.. LINO. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE. MISCELLANEOUS PUB. No. 1528-2011
EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2011. at iv. 14 (2012), available at http://waw.cnpp.
usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc20 11pdf
117. Cohen, supra note 60, at 202.
118. See Charles F. Willson, Note, But Daddy, Why Can't I Go to College? The Frightening
De-Kline ofSupportfor Children'sPost-Secondary Education, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1118 & n.193
(1996) (citing ANDREA HT.BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT 38-39 (1993); Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the
Romance ofEconomics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1068 (1995)).
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costs associated with raising a child and is especially inadequate to fund a
college education.
Additionally, some custodial parents are often faced with
the harsh reality of raising a child without any financial assistance when the noncustodial parent fails to abide by court order and contribute any financial
support-a reality that is not only sad for the children and the single parents
directly impacted by the non-custodial parent's failure but also for the state of
our society. 120
Regardless of the economic hardships associated with raising a child in a
non-intact family, all children of divorced, separated, or unmarried parents are
forced to cope with the emotional and psychological realities of familial unrest,
often at very young age.
Many children of single-parent households lack the
emotional support necessary to promote their healthy mental development.122
Thus, there are obvious, justifiable reasons for treating children of divorced,
separated, or unmarried parents "differently" than those of intact families. The
realities of growing up as a child of a single, divorced, or unmarried parent
cannot be ignored by courts or legislatures charged with addressing this problem.
Nevertheless, the financial implications for all children approaching the age
of majority that desire a higher education are grave. College tuition rates
continue to rise as the job market continues to dwindle.123 Yet, the importance
of a college education cannot be more evident.124 According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the demand for college-educated employees and professionals is
increasing, while the demand for employees with only a high school diploma is
decreasing.125 As of October 2011, the unemployment rate of high school
graduates, at 25.2%, was more than double the unemployment rate of college
students.126 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, in the
2010-2011 academic year, the average total cost of attendance for in-state
students attending public four-year universities and living on campus was

119. Id. (citing BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 118, at 38-39; Estin, supra note 118, at
1068).
120. See id. at 1119 (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.. YOUTH
INDICATORS 1993: TREND IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN YOUTH 59-60) ("In 1989, only

75.2% of women awarded child support received any payments, with 51.4% receiving the full
amount and 23.8% receiving partial amounts.").
121. See Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against
Including Post-Majority Educational Expenses in Court-Ordered Child Support, 34 IND. L. REV.
343, 367 (2001).
122. See id. at 365 (quoting JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE. SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN. AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 158-59 (1989)).

123. Jason Notte, Student Loan Debt Helps Stifle Housing Market, MSN MONEY (Apr. 15,
2013, 7:31 AM), http:/morey.msn.com/now/post.aspx?post=5c9cab4c-a5c8-4a5a-9872-5atb76
bb8a45.
124. See McMullen, supra note 121. at 345.
125. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, College Enrollment
and Work Activity of 2011 High School Graduates (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov
inews.release/hsgec.nr0.htm.
126. Id.
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$20,100, while the cost for students attending private nonprofit institutions was
$39,800.'
Some parents of intact families are, for whatever reason, be it personal or
financial. unwilling to provide financial assistance for their children after the age
of majority-including monetary support to attend postsecondary educational
institutions. 128 Most high school graduates must decide whether to undertake
astronomical amounts of debt, with little prospects of future job security, to
accomplish their goals of undergraduate degree attainment. 19 According to the
National Center for Education Statistics, 52.9% of full-time undergraduates
receive student loans while 65.6% of all undergraduates receive some form of
financial aid. 1
Some argue that rather than treating children of non-intact families
differently, state legislation providing for financial support past the age of
majority by court order, as well as the courts that interpret the legislation to
include educational purposes, merely attempts to put the children into a position
they would have been had their families remained intact.131 Although this
argument may be made and supported by persuasive case law, it simply cannot
be stated that legislation-like South Carolina Code section 63-3-530(A)(17)
and the MeLeod court's application of it-provides children of divorced,
separated, and unmarried parents with equal educational opportunities as
children in intact homes.
Rather, the court has the discretion to provide
children from non-intact families a financial opportunity for higher education by
court order-an opportunity not provided to children of intact families.
But, a court's imposition of college expenses on parents not subject to court
order involves controversial issues regarding governmental interference with
parental autonomy. Traditionally, courts refuse to infringe upon the parenting
decisions of intact families absent a showing of abuse or neglect.'
Critics often
question: What gives courts the right to tell a parent how to raise a child by
requiring them to pay for postsecondary education?

127. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUB. No. 2012-045, Tim

CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, at 98 (2012). available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/
2012045.pdf (addressing, as "Indicator 40," the price of attending ain undergraduate institution,
referring only to first-time, full-time students).
128. See McLeod v. Starnes. 396 S.C. 647. 658. 723 S.E.2d 198. 204-05 (2012).
129. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUB. No. 2009-116, 2007-08
NATIONAL POSTSECONDARY STUDENT AID STUDY (NPSAS:08), at 5 tbl.1 (2009), available at

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009166.pdf.
131. E.g., Willson, supra note 118, at 1123 25; Cf In re Marriage ofVrban, 293 N.W.2d 198,
202 (Iowa 1980) (noting that the "differences in the circumstances between married and divorced
parents establishes the necessity to discriminate between the classes"); McLeod, 396 S.C. at 658.
723 S.E.2d at 204-05 (noting the differences between married and divorced couples and their
circumstances).
132. Contra Willson, supra note 118, at 1124 (citing H.B. 1340, 1993 Leg. (Pa. 1993); Curtis
v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 274 (Pa. 1995) (Montenuro, J., dissenting)).
133. Id. at 1115.
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Although it may be a controversial issue in South Carolina as well, the
state's interest in promoting higher education to protect the future of South
Carolina and the welfare of its citizens far outweighs any burden placed on
parental rights resulting from the state's interference with parental autonomy.
Although courts and legislatures are customarily reluctant to place obligations
and restrictions on the many decisions involved in raising a child, state
authorities have consistently interfered with the legal rights of parents in matters
in which concerns for the public welfare and child protection are serious.14 The
state has already demonstrated the importance of education by requiring all
children tinder the age of eighteen to attend a state-certified educational
institution,
a fact that demonstrates the state's willingness to interfere with
parental autonomy when the education of its youth is involved.
B. How Do Te Fix it?
How should South Carolina appropriately protect its interests in promoting
higher education and support those in need of financial assistance after the age of
majority without violating the right to equal protection of the law or encroaching
on parental discretion? The issue is complex. As explicated above, any viable
solution will necessarily have to address concerns over issues such as parental
rights, economic freedom, financial ability, state interests in educating its youth,
and the protection of children. In light of these issues, the South Carolina
General Assembly should adopt legislation that provides-for all children who
suffer from a serious need for financial support and have a strong desire to
receive a college education-access to the family court system and the
opportunity to benefit from court-ordered educational support for postsecondary
education. Legislation eliminating all familial classification requirements that
are currently necessary for courts to subject a parent to court-ordered
postsecondary financial support would secondarily prevent future equal
protection challenges by divorced parents as well as those subject to court order,
because the statute would no longer create a classification.
As evidenced by the current discretion and control the family court is
provided to resolve serious familial disputes, the family court is the body bestequipped to determine under what circumstances a child of an intact family
should be awarded financial assistance for postsecondary education.13
The
South Carolina Supreme Court outlined four factors to help guide courts in
determining whether to mandate postsecondary educational support, but it did
not constrain judicial consideration to only those enumerated factors.137

134. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-2510 to -2620 (Supp. 2012) (vesting the family court
with the discretion to terminate parental rights).
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (1976).
136. S.C. R. FAM. CT. 16.
137. Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 39, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653-54 (1979), abrogated by

Webb v. Sowvell, 387 S.C. 328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010).
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However, children of intact families who meet the four factors outlined in
Risinger would be the most deserving of postsecondary educational support
under new legislation. The compelling policy implications and the countless
unique familial situations allude to possibilities that a family court may face
under a claim for college expenses, thus making it nearly impossible to legislate
accordingly. Therefore, the law should provide the family court with wide
discretion in determining what is best for all parties involved and to adequately
promote the interests of the state. In turn, family courts afforded the discretion
under new legislation must remain cognizant of the four factors outlined in
Risinger 1 38 when faced with postsecondary educational support claims brought
by children of intact families, thus exercising the necessary judicial restraint.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although the South Carolina Supreme Court in AcLeod incorrectly
identified the proper classification for analyzing the equal protection challenge to
court-mandated postsecondary support, it appropriately acknowledged the
necessity of providing postsecondary educational support for those majorityaged children with a strong desire to attend college. but who need financial
assistance to do so.
To fill this need, McLeod's application must be expanded
through legislation to provide an equal opportunity to children of intact families.
As the job market continues to suffer and college tuition rates continue to rise, an
expansion of the application of McLeod becomes even more important. The
state's compelling interest in ensuring the protection of its youth, as well as a
stable economic and educational future. can only be adequately achieved by
promoting postsecondary education. It is imperative that the state's interest be
realized through legislative enactment affording family courts with the judicial
discretion to provide financial assistance, regardless of a child's familial
classification.
Emily,4. Evans
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